Iraqi authorities networks have emerged because the goal of an “elaborate” cyber assault marketing campaign orchestrated by an Iran state-sponsored risk actor referred to as OilRig.
The assaults singled out Iraqi organizations such because the Prime Minister’s Workplace and the Ministry of International Affairs, cybersecurity firm Verify Level stated in a brand new evaluation.
OilRig, additionally referred to as APT34, Crambus, Cobalt Gypsy, GreenBug, Hazel Sandstorm (previously EUROPIUM), and Helix Kitten, is an Iranian cyber group related to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Safety (MOIS).
Energetic since not less than 2014, the group has a monitor report of conducting phishing assaults within the Center East to ship a wide range of customized backdoors resembling Karkoff, Shark, Marlin, Saitama, MrPerfectionManager, PowerExchange, Photo voltaic, Mango, and Menorah for data theft.
The most recent marketing campaign is not any exception in that it includes the usage of a brand new set of malware households dubbed Veaty and Spearal, which include capabilities to execute PowerShell instructions and harvest recordsdata of curiosity.
“The toolset used on this focused marketing campaign employs distinctive command-and-control (C2) mechanisms, together with a customized DNS tunneling protocol, and a tailored electronic mail primarily based C2 channel,” Verify Level stated.
“The C2 channel makes use of compromised electronic mail accounts throughout the focused group, indicating that the risk actor efficiently infiltrated the sufferer’s networks.”
A few of the actions that the risk actor took in executing the assault, and following it, have been per ways, methods, and procedures (TTPs) that OilRig has employed when finishing up related operations up to now.
This contains the usage of email-based C2 channels, particularly leveraging beforehand compromised electronic mail mailboxes to situation instructions and exfiltrate information. This modus operandi has been widespread to a number of backdoors resembling Karkoff, MrPerfectionManager, and PowerExchange.
The assault chain is kicked off through misleading recordsdata masquerading as benign paperwork (“Avamer.pdf.exe” or “IraqiDoc.docx.rar”) that, when launched, pave the way in which for the deployment of Veaty and Spearal. The an infection pathway is probably going stated to have concerned a component of social engineering.
The recordsdata provoke the execution of intermediate PowerShell or Pyinstaller scripts that, in flip, drop the malware executables and their XML-based configuration recordsdata, which embrace details about the C2 server.
“The Spearal malware is a .NET backdoor that makes use of DNS tunneling for [C2] communication,” Verify Level stated. “The information transferred between the malware and the C2 server is encoded within the subdomains of DNS queries utilizing a customized Base32 scheme.”
Spearal is designed to execute PowerShell instructions, learn file contents and ship it within the type of Base32-encoded information, and retrieve information from the C2 server and write it to a file on the system.
Additionally written .NET, Veaty leverages emails for C2 communications with the tip aim of downloading recordsdata and executing instructions through particular mailboxes belonging to the gov-iq.internet area. The instructions permit it to add/obtain recordsdata and run PowerShell scripts.
Verify Level stated its evaluation of the risk actor infrastructure led to the invention of a unique XML configuration file that is seemingly related to a 3rd SSH tunneling backdoor.
It additional recognized an HTTP-based backdoor, CacheHttp.dll, that targets Microsoft’s Web Data Companies (IIS) servers and examines incoming net requests for “OnGlobalPreBeginRequest” occasions and executes instructions after they happen.
“The execution course of begins by checking if the Cookie header is current in incoming HTTP requests and reads till the; signal,” Verify Level stated. “The primary parameter is F=0/1 which signifies whether or not the backdoor initializes its command configuration (F=1) or runs the instructions primarily based on this configuration (F=0).”
The malicious IIS module, which represents an evolution of a malware categorised as Group 2 by ESET in August 2021 and one other APT34 IIS backdoor codenamed RGDoor, helps command execution and file learn/write operations.
“This marketing campaign towards Iraqi authorities infrastructure highlights the sustained and centered efforts of Iranian risk actors working within the area,” the corporate stated.
“The deployment of a customized DNS tunneling protocol and an email-based C2 channel leveraging compromised accounts highlights the deliberate effort by Iranian actors to develop and preserve specialised command-and-control mechanisms.”
